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Judge Wright and the First Amendment
By JOHN P. FRANK*
I
It is a short and simple gospel, the faith that free speech means
that speech shall be free. The founding fathers gave that original sum-
mons to the faithful two centuries ago. By the time the call reached the
courts, a century and a half had passed, and the words had become
strangely muted with time.'
The twentieth century brought new prophets to an old faith. Dur-
ing the first third of this century, the judicial sages were Holmes, Bran-
deis, and Learned Hand. In the period between 1940 and 1980,
Holmes and Brandeis departed and Hand became an heresiarch.2 But
new figures have come forward, among them J. Skelly Wright. If Jus-
tice Black was the philosopher of free speech and Justice Douglas its
historian, Judge J. Skelly Wright is its broken field runner. Without
the freedom of a high court judge to brush aside his obstacles, and
without a single completely like-minded colleague, he has darted and
twisted and turned, leaping over every obstruction to advance the ball.
Wright routinely faces free speech problems infinitely more so-
phisticated and far-reaching than those confronting his predecessors.
Holmes' finest hour came in a case involving a tiny group of persons
conspiring to print 5,000 leaflets principally distributed by being
thrown out of a window. 3 Brandeis did his best for a Miss Whitney in a
case in which she, though a member of something called the Commu-
nist Labor Party, had not personally done anything.4 These are classic
cases of a challenged right to make insignificant communications with-
* Lewis and Roca, Phoenix, Arizona. I have had the benefit of close thinking and
criticism from my respected and scholarly friend, Roger Newman.
1. For a close analysis of the evolution of the free speech concept from Lockian ideal-
ism to Jamesian pragmatism, see Frank, Bill of Rights: Physics, Idealism and Pragmatism, in
CONSITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 475 (R. Collins ed. 1979).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), a 'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1950).
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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out meaningful accompanying activity to a small group of people.
These cases concern brave, possibly foolish, but certainly infinitesimal
communication.
Wright, on the other hand, copes with audiences in the millions
and their right to hear. Most cases involving regulatory agencies such
as the Federal Communications Commission are ordinarily reviewed
in Wright's court and rarely go before the Supreme Court. When Con-
gress prohibited cigarette advertising on the air, for instance, Wright
dissented from a majority which held the statute valid.5 The ads in
question were distributed nationwide, costing millions of dollars; the
challenged speech was by major corporations, and was heard nation-
wide.
Wright wishes to let the world know that he is no friend of the
Marlboro Man or the Salem Girl, who are really "seductive merchants
of death."6 The First Amendment, however, "does not protect only
speech that is healthy or harmless."7 As his court had previously held
that cigarette advertising "states a position on a matter of public con-
troversy," such advertising is within the core protection of the First
Amendment.8 He regards the prohibition on cigarette advertising as a
coup for the cigarette industry, for under earlier decisions of his court,
stations which carried cigarette advertising were required under the
Fairness Doctrine to "present a fair number of anti-smoking
messages." 9 The net effect was a reduction in cigarette consumption.
The very success of such anti-cigarette advertising "frightened the ciga-
rette industry into calling on Congress to silence the debate."' 0 Judge
Wright found this antithetical to the principles underlying the First
Amendment: "The theory of free speech is grounded on the belief that
people will make the right choice if presented with all points of view on
a controversial issue." 1
5. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 587 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright,
J., dissenting), af'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
6. Id at 587.
7. Id
8. Id Wright long anticipated the Supreme Court's new position on commercial
speech in the First Amendment in this and other cases.
9. Banzhaffv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
10. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 590 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright,
J., dissenting).
11. Id See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26-28 (1960); Emerson, Toward a
General Theory ofthe First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 881 (1963). I return to this theo-
retical base in the last section of this essay, noting now merely that this cockeyed optimism is
a fragment of the belief that evolution is ever upward, without retrograde mutation. I do not
know that Wright has ever dealt with Mill's observation of the "idle sentimentality that the
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Wright engaged in the most complicated kind of free speech anal-
ysis when reviewing FCC rules which prohibit pay exhibitions of fea-
ture films that are more than three, but less than ten years old on
television, and concerning related restrictions on commercial advertis-
ing.12 Fifteen cases dealing with facets of this problem were consoli-
dated.' 3 The free speech portion of the opinion is clearly Wright's.
The opinion finds the rules invalid as to pay cable but not necessarily
invalid as to subscription broadcast television. 4 Wright accepts the ob-
servation of Professor Meildejohn that "rules restricting speech do not
necessarily abridge freedom of speech."' 5 He draws explicitly from
Meildejohn for the proposition that "regulations which transform
cacophony into ordered presentation" may be consistent with the First
Amendment in the sense that the hearers cannot comprehend unless
each speaker speaks in turn. 6 Nonetheless, restrictions on speech are
presumptively invalid, and as to pay cable, the "no advertising" rule
serves no "important or substantial. . . interest."' 7 On the other hand,
a series of specialized restrictions as to subscription broadcasts were
upheld. 18
Another Wright opinion concludes that the FCC may prohibit the
makers of Listerine from proclaiming the medicinal virtues of a prod-
uct which is really not very beneficial to sufferers of colds or sore
throats, and may also require corrective advertising which states that
the product does not have the advertised curative effects.' 9 On the
other hand, Wright does not accept the requirement that the corrective
advertising carry language "contrary to prior advertising," as such
would constitute a needless humiliation.2 ° But to do less than to re-
quire corrective advertising would mean that any advertiser could
deceive as long as he wished and be secure in the knowledge that, at
worst, he could only be ordered to stop. The Supreme Court has
truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error." J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY,
quoted in R. FRASER, THE DARK AoES AND THE AGE OF GOLD 45 (1973).
12. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
13. I1d at 17. Wright's position ona court which must review reactions of administrative
agencies has led to his intense interest in that subject. See, e.g., Wright, Courts and the
Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375 (1974);
Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
14. 567 F.2d at 13-15.
15. Id at 46.
16. Id
17. Id at 49-50.
18. Id at 59-60.
19. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
950 (1978).
20. 562 F.2d at 763.
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aligned itself with Wright's earlier views on commercial speech, and
such restrictions have become current Supreme Court policy.21
In yet another FCC case, Judge Wright invalidated an agency re-
quirement that compelled all noncommercial educational radio and tel-
evision stations receiving federal funding to make audit records of all
broadcasts "in which any issue of public importance is discussed"
available to the Commission and others.22 The matter could have been
approached on First Amendment or equal protection grounds, but
Wright was able to obtain a majority only on the latter basis.' The
court split five to four, three judges agreeing on First Amendment and
equal protection grounds, two on equal protection grounds, and four
dissenting.24 The First Amendment question addressed the substantial
burden placed on noncommercial broadcasts, the risk of direct govern-
mental interference in program content, and the absence of any readily
apparent public interest; the court concluded that any classification
having such an impact must be "narrowly tailored to serve" the public
interest.25
In each of these cases, Wright is dealing with the communications
industry, with giant businesses and giant audiences. None of these
cases have any special political significance; all are fundamentally
problems in commercial communications. This is not to suggest that
Judge Wright does not hear the old-line cases as well. A classic prob-
lem involves telephone company records of personal communica-
tions.26 The question is whether and to what extent these records may
be made available to law enforcement authorities or used directly in
connection with criminal prosecutions. A reporter's committee sued
AT&T for a determination that its phone records could not be turned
over "without prior notice to subscriber." The committee lost. The ma-
jority emphasized the fact that the disputed records gave only the infor-
mation that a call had been made from one number to another; the
content of the conversation was not revealed.
However, the very fact of communication does reveal a reporter's
sources. A string of calls to his wife may simply relate to the domestic
21. Id at 762.
22. Community-Service Broadcasting v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
23. Id at 1103-04.
24. Id at 1104.
25. Id at 1122-23.
26. Reporters Comm. v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
949 (1979). An unrelated speech-press-fair trial problem is trial news coverage. While it has
not cropped up in Wright's cases, it appears in his general writing; see Wright, A Judge's
View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50 A.B.A.J. 1125 (1964); Wright, Fair Trial-
Free Press, 38 F.R.D. 435 (1965).
[Vol. 7:000
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scene, but a series of calls to a staff member of a public official, or even
an isolated call, in context, may reveal a source. The issue, as Judge
Wright noted in an extensive dissent,27 is whether the confidentiality of
the reporter's sources is entitled to any constitutional protection. "First
Amendment rights to gather and disseminate news," he argued, "are
implicated when the confidentiality of their sources is threatened."28
He found that this "wholesale disclosure" would turn up "the names of
all the sources with whom the reporter has communicated, many of
whom may be individuals who bear no relation to any potential crimi-
nal investigation and thus would never be subject to disclosure through
grand jury proceedings."29
The publication cases have occupied much of Wright's attention.
In most cases, as a matter of personal style, he writes strongly and with
conviction. In the Pentagon Papers case,30 he wrote with unusual pas-
sion. That case moved from the normal panel of three to an en bane
proceeding within twenty-four hours, but Wright was on the first panel
and there dissented from the order of the majority which permitted an
injunction "for the shortest possible period" to let the government sub-
stantiate its claim for a preliminary injunction:
This is a sad day for America. Today, for the first time in the two
hundred years of our history, the executive department has suc-
ceeded in stopping the presses. It has enlisted the judiciary in the
suppression of our most precious freedom. As if the long and
sordid war in Southeast Asia had not already done enough harm
to our people, it now is used to cut out the heart of our free insti-
tutions and system of government. I decline to follow my col-
leagues down this road and I must forcefully state my dissent.31
According to Wright, Near v. Minnesota,32 with its severe and al-
most total restriction on prior censorship of the press, was controlling
in the Pentagon Papers case. He acknowledged that there were "some
prospective harms which might conceivably justify a prior restraint on
speech or press," citing as examples from Near the publication of the
sailing dates of transports and the number and location of troops; but
Wright insisted that "[a]ll of the presumptions must run in favor of free
speech, not against it," and placed the burden on the government to
show "substantial and specific injury sufficient to override strong First
27. Reporters Comm. v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
28. Id at 1082.
29. Id at 1085.
30. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
31. Id at 1325.
32. 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
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Amendment interests."33 Here, no such injury was shown. Wright put
it bluntly: the label "top secre.t" is not enough, for "to allow a govern-
ment to suppress free speech simply through a system of bureaucratic
classification would sell our heritage far, far too cheaply."34 A day
later the full court, also following Near v. Minnesota, refused to issue
an injunction.35  The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion
shortly thereafter. 6
Wright has heard his share of libel cases, and controversial Wash-
ington columnist Drew Pearson was more than once before his court as
a defendant. In Washington Post Co. v. Keogh,37 Pearson's statement
was false, but the defense prevailed on the ground that the record
raised no genuine issue of fact as to actual malice. Wright, writing for
a divided court, addressed the practical problems of verification, "a
time-consuming process, a factor especially significant in the newspa-
per business where news quickly goes stale, commentary rapidly be-
comes irrelevant, and commercial opportunity in the form of
advertisements can easily be lost. In many instances considerations of
time and distance make verification impossible. '38 It is, he added, a
costly process, and insistence upon it would result in "self-censor-
ship."39 He applauded columnists who "seek and often uncover the
sensational, relying upon educated instinct, wide knowledge and confi-
dential tips. Verification would be certain to dry up much of the stream
of information that finds its way into their hands." 4 He would trim
malice back to deliberate publication of that which is known to be
false, imposing almost no duty to determine truth or falsity.4 ' On this
33. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
34. Id at 1326.
35. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36. United States v. Washington Post Co., 403 U.S. 943 (1971).
37. 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. Id at 972.
39. Id Wright is keenly attuned to the reality that the expense of litigation may cause
persons to abandon what may be legitimate First Amendment rights. This highly practical
concept receives an unusual application in Reed Enterprises v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), in which Congress had altered the venue statute for the mailing of obscene
materials so that a criminal action for the offense might be brought in the state of origin, the
state of delivery, or any state through which the material passes. The validity of the statute
was not at issue; at issue was the publisher's right of access to a three-judge court to chal-
lenge the statute. On holding that access was appropriate, Wright linked the special consid-
erations applicable to claimed First Amendment rights, on the one hand, with the disastrous
effect of multiple defenses through normal criminal prosecutions, on the other.
40. 365 F.2d at 972.
41. Id Judge Wright's application of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), will result in very few libel verdicts. He believes that, even where public officials are
not involved, a judge should rule as to actual malice on summary judgment; that the judge
[Vol. 7:000
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point his is a lone position on his court.
In two other Drew Pearson cases, Judge Wright dealt with pur-
loined papers.42 In the more important of the two, Pearson v. Dodd, an
employee of Senator Dodd of Connecticut had taken papers from the
senator's office, copied and returned them. Pearson then used them.
Addressing first the question of claimed invasion of privacy, Judge
Wright found that since the papers "clearly bore on appellee's qualifi-
cations as a United States Senator," there was no privacy claim. 43 He
fully recognized tort liability for intrusions such as bugging a dwelling
or tapping a phone or snooping through windows, but he would not
recognize liability for receiving the information:
A person approached by an eavesdropper with an offer to share
in the information gathered through the eavesdropping would
perhaps play the nobler part should he spurn the offer and shut
his ears. However, it seems to us that at this point it would place
too great a strain on human weakness to hold one liable in dam-
ages who merely succumbs to temptation and listens.'
Where a wiretap is involved, though, Wright has firmly protected
the privacy of the person tapped.4" In the case of New York Times
should rule a second time at the end of plaintiffs case; that the judge should rule a third time
before submission of the case to the jury; and that if actual malice is proposed to the judge's
satisfaction all three times, the matter should then go to the jury, which in turn should
decide whether there is actual malice. Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.
1970). A libel which passes the test four times will have to be some libel!
42. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1968) and Pearson v. Dodd,
410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). Liberty Lobby involved
wrongfully acquired source material, but there was no evidence of complicity between the
thief and the columnist.
43. 410 F.2d at 703.
44. Id at 705. Judge Tamm, reluctantly concurring, made sharp comment: "Conduct
for which a law enforcement officer would be soundly castigated is, by the phraseology of
the majority opinion, found tolerable; conduct which, if engaged in by government agents,
would lead to the suppression of evidence obtained by these means, is approved when used
for the profit of the press." Id at 708 (Tamm, J., concurring).
45. Wright is keenly sensitive to the interplay between the First and Fourth Amend-
ments. One of his opinions for the court, sitting en banc, is Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The case involved warrantless wiretaps by the Attorney General and
the FBI of the Jewish Defense League (JDL), an extremist group that was embarrassing the
United States in its aspirations toward detente with the Soviet Union. The administration
claimed the right to undertake surveillance without a warrant on the theory that it related to
foreign intelligence gathering. Judge Wright, closely following United States v. United
States Dist. Court (Plamondon), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), held that this wiretap of a purely
domestic organization could not be allowed without a warrant, and the opinion broadly
suggests that no warrantless wiretap will be sustained. The practice, which could be traced
back to President Franklin Roosevelt, was found unpardonable regardless of precedent, and
his recitation of gross abuses in both the Kennedy and Nixon administrations is hair-raising.
See 516 F.2d at 635-36. The opinion asserts that "[t]o allow the Executive Branch to make
its own determinations as to such matters invites abuse, and public knowledge that such
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
reporter Hedrick Smith against President Nixon and various other offi-
cials,4 6 and in the related case of Halperin against Secretary Kissinger
and others,4 7 reporter Smith's home telephone was tapped as part of an
effort to identify employees who were disclosing confidential govern-
ment information. Wright found that there was no record of justifica-
tion for the tap. While Smith, as a newspaperman, had no "special
legal privileges by dint of" that work, there remained the legitimate
"First Amendment interests of all of the appellants in not having their
private conversations overheard by the Government. 48
Since the matter does not depend upon the employment of the in-
dividual, the same result is reached in Haloerin: "Without vigilant pro-
tection of a private space in which each citizen is free to pursue his own
ideas and aspirations, we would betray our vision of a society based on
the dignity of the individual."49
Regarding the executive privilege and immunity issue, Judge
Wright was willing to assume that the executive must retain some spe-
cial powers as to national emergencies, but these "must be limited to
instances of immediate and grave peril to the nation."50 Otherwise the
executive is limited to the powers "enumerated in the Constitution or
provided by law."'I
Judge Wright was capable of tart comment on the Viet Nam War
and his sympathy for protesters was reflected in his constitutional doc-
trine. Wright felt that the White House and the Capitol ought to be the
focus of the right of petition because they are the symbols of the center
of government. In Women Strikefor Peace v. Morton, 2 the court held
invalid a prohibition on antiwar displays in the Ellipse, a park area
surrounding the Washington Monument and adjacent to the White
House.53 Wright's colleagues were prepared to uphold the right to
make the display on equal protection grounds.54 Wright wished to go
abuse is possible can exert a deathly pall over vigorous First Amendment debate on issues of
foreign policy." Id
46. Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
47. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
48. Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d at 1190.
49. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d at 1200.
50. Id at 1201.
51. Id
52. 472 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
53. Wright also wrote a concurring opinion on the same problem in Women Strike for
Peace v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 597, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1969), but the case under discussion above,
Women Strikefor Peace v. Morton, is one of his most important theoretical analyses of free
speech.
54. 472 F.2d at 1304.
[Vol. 7:000
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further: in a lone opinion he stressed the First Amendment right to
demonstrate "as close as possible to the seat of government" under the
petition clause."
The challenged demonstration in this instance was an antiwar dis-
play portraying tombstones, and he found it similar to other forms of
symbolic speech that have been permitted. 6 His problem was difficult:
"[T]he law relating to communicative conduct has developed to the
point where a full reconciliation of all the cases is no longer possible. 57
Nonetheless, he found this case to fall within "a hard core of shared
premises, ' 58 one of them being that a "public gathering" is necessary to
invoke the protection of the First Amendment.
In another demonstration case, Representative Dellums of Califor-
nia and nine other persons brought suit seeking to represent a class of
all persons arrested on the steps of the Capitol on May 5, 1971, during
a protest against the Viet Nam War.59 During the demonstration, in
which at least two members of Congress participated, the police
cordoned off the bottom of the steps and made large-scale arrests.
Those arrested were held for periods of from several hours to several
days. Plaintiffs claimed $7500 in damages for violation of their First
Amendment rights.
Judge Wright declared that the plaintiffs had a cause of action for
violation of their First Amendment rights and that the infringement of
those rights was "directly attributable to the arresting officers."60 .The
officers were held to have directly violated the First Amendment rights
of Representative Dellums; his audience "was arrested, thereby
preventing him from speaking to them."'" Removing the audience is a
harm "as great as if the speaker had himself been silenced."62 Judge
Wright did not allow money damages, however; no out-of-pocket loss
was shown.
Judge Wright was aware, however, that a demonstration can be-
come a riot. This happened in the aftermath of the Martin Luther King
assassination in 1968. Burnings, lootings and vast numbers of arrests
followed, with persons charged under the District of Columbia anti-riot
55. Id at 1287.
56. Id at 1274, 1287-88.
57. Id at 1280.
58. Id at 1281.
59. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978);
566 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
60. 566 F.2d at 195.
61. Id
62. Id
Summer 19801
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statute for engaging in "tumultuous and violent conduct." Wright's
dissent63 from the opinion affirming convictions under the District of
Columbia anti-riot statute64 frankly faces the problem: "It would blink
reality not to realize that what begins as a political or social demonstra-
tion may end violently, and the violence may come from some of the
demonstrators, from counter demonstrators, or from officials. ' 65 While
he had no doubt but that society could suppress and punish violence,
he found it very necessary to "focus precisely and exclusively on violent
conduct and on its perpetrators and not beyond."66
In another Viet Nam era case, the defendant said that he would
refuse induction into the armed services and declared: "If they ever
make me carry a rifle the first person I want in my sights is LBJ." 67 His
conviction for threatening the life of the President was affirmed, with
Wright dissenting.68 Because speech conveys ideas, he said, specific in-
tent should be required.69 Wright criticized cases in which persons
were convicted for saying words "meant as jest, as rhetoric, or as hyper-
bole," and he observed that "the label 'threat' does not preclude First
Amendment protection any more than do the labels 'obscenity' or 'li-
bel'."70
In Avrech v. Secretary of Navy,7 the defendant, while in service in
Viet Nam, made remarks highly critical of the war. He contended that
the South Vietnamese should be more active in defending themselves
and criticized the slow progress of the peace talks. The military court's
instruction on free speech did not require that the particular statement
create a clear and present danger; it merely required a determination as
to whether statements such as this were protected by the First Amend-
ment.72 The Court of Appeals found that the First Amendment issue
was not properly adjudicated before the military tribunal.73 Judge
Wright believed that the instruction was "100% wrong" and that the
63. United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., dis-
senting).
64. 22 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1122 (1973 & Supp. V 1978).
65. 419 F.2d at 1188.
66. Id
67. Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'd. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
On this one, the commentator cannot even maintain a feigned neutrality. I cannot conceive
how Wright could have failed to persuade his colleagues here; the distance from blather to
bullet is so ludicrously great that the biggest surprise is why the case was ever brought at all.
68. 402 F.2d at 686.
69. Id at 691.
70. Id at 690.
71. 520 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976).
72. 520 F.2d at 104 n.ll.
73. 1d at 104-05.
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speech was protected unless it did create a clear and present danger.74
This decision was reached well after the war was over, and Wright, in
calling for a new trial, concluded, "[n]ow that [the defendant] has been
proved right, rather than disloyal, it is the least that should be done."'75
Wright's opinions also reach conventional problems of legislative
power. When a witness before a congressional committee refused to
answer questions about his affiliation with a communist party and was
held in contempt, Judge Wright held that the subpoena was improperly
issued because the chairman alone did not have the authority to issue
it. 7 6
More unusual was a suit to enjoin publication and distribution of a
congressional committee report on the district school system.77 The re-
port contained the names of school children and complaints concerning
them, including a recital of failing grades, and disciplinary letters re-
garding sexual misconduct, vulgar behavior and vandalism. There was
no issue as to the right of Congress to look into these matters; the sole
issue was the right to privacy of the particular individuals involved.
The majority held that no constitutional right was infringed by the
publication, and Judge Wright dissented.78 He regretted the "disheart-
ening callousness to the legitimate interests of appellant children."7 9
Stressing the fact that these students were required to attend school and
the fact that they were not public figures, Wright observed that they
would be branded by this report in a manner that would seriously ham-
per their future employment.8 0 Wright enthusiastically followed the
Supreme Court's view8' that legislative committees may not "expose
for the sake of exposure."8 2
74. Id at 107. The Supreme Court has taken a much more restrictive view of freedom
of expression in the armed services. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980), and cases
cited therein; Justice Brennan, dissenting, is, as usual, closer to Judge Wright's view than
any of the other judges. Id at 361.
75. 520 F.2d at 108.
76. Liveright v. United States, 347 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Judge Wright also used
the device of giving strict and narrow interpretation to the procedures by which a congres-
sional committee could subpoena a witness in order to hold that a newspaperman, and one
quite possibly called by utter mistake by a member of the committee staff, was not in defi-
ance by virtue of his answers especially since he had not been properly called in the first
place. The avoidance of the "delicate area of First Amendment freedoms" warranted the
rigidity of construction. Shelton v. United States, 327 F.2d 601, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
77. Doe v. McMillan, 459 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd in part, afr'd in part, and
remanded, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
78. 459 F.2d at 1319 (Wright, J., dissenting).
79. Id at 1320.
80. Id at 1327.
81. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
82. Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
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Wright's free speech positions have frequently pushed back the pa-
rameters of First Amendment protection. Three colorful cases illus-
trate:
1. In one of his dissents Wright wrote that a federal employee who
made a false statement on an official form concerning past Communist
associations should not have been subject to discharge; Wright argued
that the employee "used the only means available to protect himself
against an unconstitutional assertion of government power." 3 Relying
heavily upon Baird v. State Bar ofArizona, 4 he reminded his brethren
that the employee could not have been punished had he declined to
answer at all; since the state had no "need to know" in the first place, it
had "no constitutionally legitimate interest in a correct answer."85
Granting that it would have been better had the applicant "forthrightly
challenged the questions asked him and courageously stood on his
rights,"86 Judge Wright asserted that First Amendment rights are not
limited to the courageous: "We need a Constitution because there are
also ordinary people in this country who, while more easily intimi-
dated, are still entitled to political freedom." 87
1024 (1969). In this case Wright recognized the right of a political organization (the Ku
Klux Klan) to protect its membership list. In this particular case, the right was not upheld
only because it was not timely raised and because its belated assertion appeared to be a
cover to avoid the revelation of other perfectly proper material.
83. Rodriguez v. Seamans, 463 F.2d 837, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting),
cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 1094 (1972).
84. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
85. 463 F.2d at 849.
86. Id at 852.
87. Id at 853. In Rodriguez the falsehood was immaterial because the question itself
was improper. On the other hand, where the question is perfectly proper, then full conse-
quences follow from a falsehood. See Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in
which an applicant for a radio station license who made misrepresentations was summarily
denied the license on that ground alone. Judge Wright also joined in denial of another
renewal where the licensee's programming plans were found to have been misrepresented to
the Commission; see Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir.
1972). The case deserves passing mention as a phenomenon occurring from time to time in
the District of Columbia Circuit, illustrating the perfectly amazing capacity of the court to
get itself all tangled up. In the Brandywine case, Judge Tamm wrote a very able forty-page
opinion upholding refusal of the license on multiple grounds, including violation of the
Fairness Doctrine, violation of the "personal attack principle," and misrepresentation.
Judge Wright concurred in less than a page, id. at 62. On the one hand Wright praised the
opinion of Judge Tamm and, on the other, he noted that he was "not necessarily in agree-
ment" with all the details, and therefore he rested his conclusion on the misrepresentation
argument. Judge Bazelon concurred in a word on the misrepresentation ground, reserving
his opinion for a later date, id at 63. Thereupon, having concurred, Judge Bazelon dis-
sented, id. Judges Wright and Tamm then filed a "response" to the dissent from the concur-
rence, id. at 80. As is illustrated elsewhere in this review, there are days in the District of
Columbia Circuit when earnestness vanquishes judgment.
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2. In another case Judge Wright held that routine dissemination of
arrest records in the District of Columbia to the FBI was prohibited by
a District of Columbia ordinance.88 None of the persons involved had
been convicted. While Judge Wright had "severe doubts about the
constitutionality of this practice," the court ultimately rested its deci-
sion on a District ordinance which was found to prohibit such a sweep-
ing invasion of privacy. 9
3. Finally, in a third case, Wright held that a tenant may not be
evicted in retaliation for reporting housing code violations, even
though under a District of Columbia statute on eviction,90 a landlord
was free to evict a month-to-month tenant "for any reason or for no
reason at all." 91 In Edwards v. Habib, Wright held that "[a] state court
judgment,. . . even by adjudicating private lawsuits, may unconstitu-
tionally abridge the right of free speech as well as the right to equal
protection of the laws," 92 even though, as he held in another part of the
opinion, reporting violations of law cannot be upheld as a matter of
statutory construction.93 One of his two colleagues dissented,94 and the
other agreed with him only on the statutory holding, avoiding what he
termed, Wright's "constitutional speculations." 95
Because the First Amendment covers freedom of religion as well
as freedom of speech and press, we may note a few religion cases in the
Wright canon. In Application of President and Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc. ,96 the issue was whether Mrs. Jones, a Jehovah's Witness,
could be required to accept a blood transfusion over her own and her
husband's religious objections. Because the decision had to be made
immediately, Judge Wright alone ordered the transfusion. The district
court denied review,97 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 98
Wright, tormented by the problem, wrote an extensive opinion. It
was well established that the state could, without regard to religious
consideration, compel avoidance of communicable diseases, as by vac-
cination, but a possible "right to die" presented the most private of
88. Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
89. Id at 483. See the Duncan Ordinance, Oct. 31, 1967.
90. 45 D.C. CODE ANN. § 902, 910 (1973).
91. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969).
92. 397 F.2d at 694.
93. Id at 702.
94. Id at 703 (Danaher, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 703 (McGowan, J., concurring).
96. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
97. Id at 1010.
98. 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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determinations. Clearly the matter was not for the husband to decide;
he had no authority "to order the doctors to treat his wife in a way so
that she would die."99 In some jurisdictions suicide is a crime, but the
law on suicide was not clear in the District of Columbia.
Wright went to the hospital, inquired about the patient, and found
her "hardly compos menis at the time in question; she was as little able
competently to decide for herself as any child would be."' 100 Moreover,
she was only twenty-five years of age and had a seven-month old child;
her decision to die would be the "most ultimate of voluntary abandon-
ments." 101 There are times when a judge cannot be legalistic in a book-
ish sense, and this was one of them: "The final, and compelling, reason
for granting the emergency writ was that a life hung in the balance.
There was no time for research and reflection. Death could have
mooted the cause in a matter of minutes, if action were not
" 102taken. ...
No personal torment was reflected in a decision involving the
Church of Scientology, which was selling an electrical device said to
cure cancer and other diseases. 03 One issue was whether the device
was misbranded." 4 If the Church's assertions as to the efficacy of the
device were false, then the religious doctrines must necessarily be false,
because the device and the doctrines were inseparable. Wright held
that Scientology was a religion, but held also that it may not defraud
the public by selling a worthless device without fair labeling.'
The two cases cited above stand out as unusual among cases in-
volving freedom of religion. Far different is a decision regarding the
extent to which a religious group operating radio and television stations
may require a particular religious affiliation as a condition of employ-
ment. In King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, ° a radio licensee whose pious
name reflected its orientation wished to include only Christians among
its employees. Judge Wright's opinion upheld the FCC's refusal to al-
low such a policy in relation to employees who do not deal with pro-
gram content. At issue was an amendment to Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which appears to exempt all activities of religious cor-
99. 331 F.2d at 1008.
100. Id
101. Id
102. Id at 1009.
103. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
104. 409 F.2d at 1161.
105. Id at 1160-62.
106. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
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porations from the Act's prohibition on religious discrimination in em-
ployment. 10 7 The court's choice, if it were to uphold the Commission
as it did, was either to invalidate the statute or to construe it as not
applying to the Federal Communications Act. Wright held that Con-
gress was probably not required to forbid employment discrimination
in the first place, but if it did, it could not then violate the establishment
clause by granting a special exemption to federally licensed businesses
using public air waves. Faced with the comprehensive and richly de-
tailed opinion in King's Garden, a commentator can do little more than
marvel at the brilliance of Wright's analysis.
II
We turn from an overview of Wright's opinions to a consideration
of Wright's method. His way of solving problems and presenting an-
swers is the same across-the-board: Wright on free speech is the same
craftsman as Wright on any other subject. At the same time there is a
special intensity in his free speech opinions, as the values involved
seem to stir him to the roots of his being. One is impressed by his
extraordinary sincerity.'01 The three dominant factors of Wright's
work are creativity, drive and fairness.
Rarely is the work of a judge on an intermediate court subject to
close published analysis. We have become used to the grand style of
the Supreme Court, which is free to overrule. An intermediate judge
must follow, and a member of a tribunal that sits in panels has obliga-
tions not merely to a higher court but to the decisions of other panels in
his own court. Working from this position, Wright must build with
blocks which, at first glance, are not always well hewn to the task.
There are times when Wright must rely on a single authority; in
the Pentagon Papers case, 10 9 for example, Near v. Minnesota and the
rule against prior restraint virtually disposed of the issue in question.
On rare occasions, Wright, after canvassing all authorities, can do little
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-i (Supp. 111972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2 (1970)).
108. The frequent isolation of Wright's position, a matter developed more fully below,
leaves one with an occasional doubt as to whether the matter is always worth the bother.
See, e.g., Von Sleichter v. United States, 472 F.2d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972), in which Judge Wright, dissenting, contends in some detail and with much
scholarly analysis that there must be a determination as to community standards where
someone trafficking in heroin, and told to stop by a police officer, shouted an epithet and ran
away. 472 F.2d at 1257. A conviction for disorderly conduct was upheld by the majority,
and I have some doubt that the problem was worth as much attention as the full panel gave
it.
109. See notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra.
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more than give up and shoot from the heart; in the blood transfusion
case,110 after every authority had been considered and all were found
wanting, the fact that "life hung in the balance" was allowed to control.
The usual Wright approach, however, is constructively creative,
making fair use of legal materials but in a quite original manner. In
Edwards v. Habib,"' for example, Wright worked from the Restrictive
Covenant cases, but applied them to a new field:
[May] a court ... consistently with the Constitution prefer the
interests of an absentee landlord in evicting a tenant solely be-
cause she has reported violations of the housing code to those of
a tenant in improving her housing by resort to her rights to peti-
tion the government and to report violations of laws designed for
her protection. . .[?] On this theory, if it would be unreasonable
to prefer the landlord's interest, it would also be unconstitu-
tional.' 12
He supported his hypothesis with Marsh v. Alabama,"3 "which,
like the instant case, involved state-aided privately-initiated abridge-
ment of First Amendment freedoms.""' 4 Wright displays originality
here. No other judge, I suspect, would have had the ingenuity to fash-
ion these ideas into his analysis; at the same time, he marshalls legal
materials to his support and is very convincing. He also develops the
idea that, quite apart from freedom of speech, a right to petition the
government to report the violation of laws "is constitutionally pro-
tected."
Wright's sense of fairness manifests itself in many ways. For ex-
ample, in the blood transfusion case" 5 Wright was not about to let
someone die while he retreated to the sidelines to make up his mind. In
the Listerine advertising case," 16 Wright saw that an advertiser should
not go unpunished for lying, but recognized also that the advertiser
cannot fairly be made a spectacle of public breastbeating. And, as
Wright noted in the Edwards case, a person cannot fairly or rationally
be evicted from his house because as a good citizen he reports a viola-
tion of the law. Wright argued similarly that while part of our constitu-
110. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964). See notes 96-102 and accompanying text supra.
111. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). See notes 90-95
and accompanying text supra.
112. 397 F.2d at 695.
113. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
114. 397 F.2d at 695.
115. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964). See notes 96-102 and accompanying text supra.
116. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
950 (1978). See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
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tional tradition allows one to preach any religious faith, religious
freedom does not translate into a license to sell mismarked electrical
appliances."17
Further illustrations would be superfluous. A distinguished au-
thority, who had occasion to know, once said, "the law is a ass, a id-
iot."1 " To this we may add Wright's corollary, "Not while this court
sits."
One measure of the extent to which Wright beats new paths is the
extent to which he is forced to state his views without support from
other judges on the panel. In Reporters Committeefor Freedom of Press
v. AT&T,19 a case involving the accessibility of telephone company
toll billing records in criminal investigations of reporters, Wright was
compelled to go it alone in dissent.
In another case involving the requirement that noncommercial ed-
ucational stations make audit records of all broadcasts available to the
FCC, the court sat as a panel and Wright was unable to find a single
persuasive voice among those of his colleagues. In one of the Drew
Pearson cases,'20 he spoke for the court, but his colleague, Judge Mc-
Gowan, disagreed with two sections of his opinion. Judge McGowan,
not wishing to accept Wright's constitutional arguments, also declined
to join his opinion in the Edwards eviction case.12'
These examples should suffice to make the point: very frequently
when Wright is making major advances in constitutional theory, he is
on his own. He does not enjoy the support of a Douglas, a Brennan, a
Murphy or a Rutledge. The vastness of the field he has tilled is all the
more remarkable because he has tilled it alone.
On occasions when he finds two like-minded colleagues, Wright
can be adventurous. For example, in Utz v. Cu/linane,' the court held
that routine dissemination of arrest records to the FBI was prohibited
by a District of Columbia ordinance. None 6f the four persons seeking
to restrain the distribution had been convicted. The panel, consisting
of Judge Robinson (with whom Judge Wright's First Amendment
views are usually compatible) and Judge Mehrige of Richmond, Vir-
ginia (the one figure in the American legal system who can probably
117. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969) discussed in notes 103-105 and accompanying text supra.
118. C. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, in Ch. 51, words of Mr. Bumble.
119. 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
120. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
121. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
122. 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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"out liberal" Judge Wright)'23 decided the case on statutory grounds.
The three also managed to cast considerable constitutional doubt on
the practice, finding that, given the presumption of innocence, there
could be no value in distributing this information.'24
The work Wright does, whether on his own or with others, is ex-
traordinarily substantial. Justice Murphy, the very symbol of the just
man come to judging, on one occasion said, "I don't care what the tech-
nicalities are; this is so wrong that I just won't do it."' 25 Judge Wright,
ever the supreme artisan, stands as firmly. Wright crafts the most novel
of his arguments so solidly that those who would disagree must work
hard to refute them. Holding that a flat ban on paid public issue an-
nouncements by broadcast licensees violates the First Amendment, at
least where other paid announcements are accepted, Wright rejected a
"crabbed judicial view of 'state action' "126 and adopted Professor
Emerson's concept of "[t]he First Amendment values of individual self-
fulfillment through expression and individual participation and public
debate .. ."127 A ban on all controversial speech "is a form of cen-
sorship, just the same. It is a favoritism toward the status quo and pub-
lic apathy and, in these cases, a favoritism toward bland
commercialism." ' 28
Wright's unusual thoroughness is further demonstrated by his
treatment of the arrests that followed the riots triggered by the assassi-
123. Wright opened an article honoring Judge Bazelon by saying: "I am probably the
only judge on any federal court of appeals who can call Judge David L. Bazelon conserva-
tive." Wright, A Colleague's Tribute to Judge David L. Bazelon, on the Twenty-Ffth Anniver-
sary ofhis Appointment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 250 (1974). Judge Wright has given a great deal
of thought to the role of judges as policy makers; see, e.g., Wright, Role ofthe Supreme Court
in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1968).
124. Occasionally Caesar nods, and so does Wright; this is one of the rare instances of a
disjointed and ill-organized Wright opinion. His opinions run to the monumental but rarely
to the superfluous. For further application of Wright's view on the impropriety of dissemi-
nation of arrest records in an unusually complicated procedural situation, see Morrow v.
District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
125. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 183 (1946).
126. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
127. Id at 655.
128. Id at 661. For all his enthusiasm for controversial discussion and his wish to es-
chew the bland, Wright ran into real problems in passing on the license renewal for a radio
station engaged in racially offensive broadcasting. In Anti-Defamation League v. FCC, 403
F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1968), Wright concurred in the holding that the station should be
permitted to be relicensed, but he was obviously unhappy over the station's practices. His
concurrence was more an expression of pain than a serious analysis of a problem, how to
deal with it, and how to square it with his general endorsement of even offensive free speech.
He appeared to accept the dissenting views in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267-305
(1952), but elucidation of just where he is on this difficult subject will have to wait.
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nation of Martin Luther King.129 Wright wished to control violence
without suppressing activities protected by the First Amendment. He
found that the applicable District of Columbia statute "may easily de-
ter people from attending an assemblage at which violence might oc-
cur.' 130 Wright comprehensively analyzed both the problem and the
relevant law in his and other jurisdictions. The point here is that re-
gardless of whether Judge Wright is right or wrong, persuasive or un-
persuasive, the case he makes to. sustain his point of view is always
superbly structured and meticulously researched.
III
I now turn to the intellectual understructure of Wright's First
Amendment work, his philosophic belief in the freedom of ideas. For
this purpose, I put aside the rest of the First Amendment and focus
only upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press.1
3
'
A judge need not have any meaningful or coherent philosophy re-
garding any part of the law. His approach may consist simply of
matching the reformation at hand to the information in the books and
aligning the case at bar with the precedent most appropriate under the
circumstances. Yet if the judge is to be more than a ribbon clerk, he
needs skill greater than that required for simply matching colors. As
Justice Cardozo put it:
A philosophy of law will tell us how law comes into being, how it
grows .... It is these generalities and abstractions that give di-
129. United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 1193.
13 1. This requires the discarding of some thought-provoking material on privacy, a mat-
ter to which Judge Wright has given intense consideration. It is, for example, a distinct
advance over all other thinking on privacy to hold that a congressional committee might be
enjoined from publishing its report where the report gratuitously includes names and details
concerning alleged misdeeds of school children. Judge'Wright argued persuasively that
"[t]he right of individuals to live their lives and maintain their personalities and affairs free
from undue exposure to the outside world is a central premise of our constitutional and legal
framework." Doe v. McMillan, 459 F.2d 1304, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In holding that Presi-
dent Nixon was not free to direct the wiretapping of the home telephone of a newspaper
reporter, Wright stressed the legitimate First Amendment interest in keeping the govern-
ment out of private conversations. Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
These and other opinions give practical effect to the concept of the right of the individual to
be left alone, a belief which is at the heart of his philosophy concerning man and society.
For a most comprehensive analysis of the interplay between defamation, privacy and the
public's right to know, see Wright, Defamation, Pri'acy, and the Public ' Right to Know: 4
National Problem andA, New Approach, 46 Tax. L. REv. 630 (1968), in which he describes
these as "three disparate and often conflcting interests. Defamation and privacy work to
restrict publication, whereas the essence of the third interest-the public's right to know-is
free and unfettered communication." Id at 633.
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rection to legal thinking, sway the minds of judges, that deter-
mine when the balance waivers, the outcome of the doubtful
lawsuit. Implicit in every decision where the question is, so to
speak, at large, is a philosophy of the origin and aim of law, a
philosophy which, however veiled, is in truth the final arbiter. It
accepts one set of arguments, modifies another, rejects a third,
standing over in reserve as a court of ultimate appeal.13
2
Cardozo wrote as the judge of the highest court in New York; he
was the philosopher-king and, unless he happened into an area of fed-
eral law, there was no other court to say him nay. Wright on the Court
of Appeals does not have the same freedom that Cardozo had. Yet
Wright's opinions are seldom reviewed, and Wright often seeks to per-
suade his own and future generations even if he is not successful in
persuading his own court. Wright is truly a philosopher of the freedom
of speech and of the press, yet he rarely accepts the scepter of a philoso-
pher-king; he is instead a Socrates, a teacher, one who guides as often
as he commands.
The fundamental philosophic battles over the First Amendment in
this century, have grown out of the conflict between idealism and prag-
matism. 33 While discoveries in the field of physics may reasonably be
expected to change the pattern of intellectual thought in the free speech
area in some distant tomorrow, ' 34 the deaths of such First Amendment
thinkers as Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Harlan, and Profes-
sors Meiklejohn and Bickel have created an intellectual void. Professor
Thomas I. Emerson remains our most distinguished First Amendment
scholar in the academic world, and Wright, near the end of his career,
stands virtually alone in the American judiciary as a preeminent theo-
retician on the freedom of communication. The tendency of even the
best of today's judicial generation is simply to react to speech and press
problems; Wright truly deliberates.
Unfortunately, the case and controversy system sifts out many of
the cases which are sufficiently varied and complex to invite the eluci-
dation of a coherent system of thought on speech and press; perhaps
Judge Wright will be persuaded to follow the course chosen by Justice
132. B. CARDOZO, Growth and Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN
CARDOZO 196-97 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
133. Frank, Hugo L Black: Free Speech and the Declaration of Independence, 1977 U.
ILL. L. F. 577. Without stating them in the same way, Judge Wright adopts much the same
conclusions with his "Meiklejohnian" absolutism regarding the First Amendment. See his
comprehensive essay on the role of the Supreme Court generally, with a substantial aside on
this point, in Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REV. 769, 786-87 (1971).
134. See J. FRANK, The Bill of Rights: Physics, Idealism and Pragmatism, in CONSTITU-
TIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 475 (R. Collins ed. 1979).
[Vol. 7:000
Summer 19801 JUDGE WRIGHT AND FIRST AMENDMENT
Black135 and present lectures which do so.
Perhaps the most difficult First Amendment problem involves
drawing a distinction between speech which is protected and action
which may be illegal. Picketing, for example, may be a form of free
speech, but it is not protected when its purpose is to compel a violation
of the antitrust laws.13
6
Wright saw the Pentagon Papers case as a simple matter of a prior
restraint on publication; yet, for all of the fervor with which he decried
prior restraint when it was imposed "even before the judges have read
the offending material,"' 137 he nonetheless recognized that "there are
some prospective harms which might conceivably justify prior restraint
on speech or press." 138 He accepted the proposition from Near v. Min-
nesota,139 for example, that the government might enjoin publication
of the sailing dates of transports and of the number and location of
troops. 140
The Wright opinion in the Pentagon Papers case adds more fervor
than light to the solution of the underlying problem; because of the
extreme haste of the occasion, he could say no more than that "[t]here
must be a showing of substantial and specific injury sufficient to over-
ride strong First Amendment interests."' 14 ' This approach is more of a
procedure than a philosophy. It is a method calling for a balancing of
interests in a form resembling the clear and present danger test, a
formula that appeals to Wright. He took this approach in his dissent in
A vrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 142 where he maintained that if a mili-
tary officer in Viet Nam who was critical of the management of the war
was to be courtmartialled, it could only be upon a showing that his
criticism had created a clear and present danger of some specific harm.
On other, less hurried occasions, Wright has had the opportunity
to grapple with the relationship between word and deed. His most ex-
tensive analysis of free speech was in the Ellipse demonstrators case.' 43
135. See H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968). A copy of Wright's 1979
Harvard Francis Biddle lecture on "Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause" re-
flects the comprehensiveness Wright can achieve by the fluid lecture method.
136. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
137. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Wright, J., dissenting).
138. Id at 1326 (Wright, J., dissenting).
139. 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
140. 283 U.S. at 716.
141. 446 F.2d at 1325-26 (Wright, J., dissenting).
142. 520 F.2d 100, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976).
143. Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See note 52
and accompanying text supra.
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In that case, the object of the demonstrators was to place an antiwar
exhibit on the Capitol Ellipse while others were holding, with Park
Service sanction, a Christmas Pageant for Peace. The latter was in the
Christmas tradition, the former in an anti-Viet Nam War spirit. The
Park Service had approved the conventional and disapproved the un-
conventional display, and none of the judges had any trouble in con-
cluding that this selectivity was a denial of equal protection. 144
However, Judge Wright took the occasion to state that it was also
an interference with First Amendment rights.145 He asserted the exist-
ence of "an absolute right to speak" when the speech "in no way inter-
feres with the rights of others."'146 One must assume that the choice of
the term "absolute" is deliberate. He cites as examples the right to
wear a black armband to protest the Viet Nam war and the right to
view offensive movies in one's own home.1 47 Because this right is "ab-
solute," given the condition of noninterference with the rights of others,
the government's attitude is immaterial. Wright felt that equal protec-
tion "is no substitute for the independent right of free expression."'
' 41
Wright is aware that he skirts the border of familiar law in the
speech-conduct cases: "[F]ull reconciliation of all of the cases is no
longer possible. . . . We can be confident in assuming that eventually
a new legal theory will emerge from this conflict-a theory which takes
full account of society's counterveiling interests and full discussion in
public order."'' 49 While he observes the distinction betwen speech and
conduct, Wright reminds readers that only the gravest abuses endan-
gering truly paramount interests will justify a limitation on speech. 50
And if, as many believe, conduct may be freely regulated under a ra-
tional basis test, then "the first task" is to distinguish between "expres-
sion" and "action."'' Wright has come to believe that this is often
distinction without a difference. He concluded, for instance, that there
is no real difference in terms of the speech-action distinction between
Edwards v. South Carolina'52 and Cox v. Louisiana.15 3 He acknowl-
144. Id at 1274.
145. Id
146. Id at 1280.
147. Id at 1287 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (armband); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (offensive movies)).
148. 472 F.2d at 1280.
149. Id at 1280-81.
150. See United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971), dis-
cussed in notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
151. 472 F.2d at 1281.
152. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
153. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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edged that there may be important differences between demonstrating
before a legislature and demonstrating before a courthouse, but these
differences
clearly do not correlate with the difference between speech and
conduct-at least as those terms are used in common parlance.
Nor are these terms, as commonly used, responsive to the inter-
ests which the First Amendment was designed to protect. Thus
we would say in ordinary conversation that a man making an
obscene telephone call is "speaking" whereas a man distributing
hand bills is "acting." And in this situation, it is surely the act
rather than the speech which should be protected.' 54
Testing new ground, Wright explores the possible term of art
meanings of these words. He agrees with Professor Emerson that the
possible harm attributable to speech is less immediate than harm attrib-
utable to action, and that the latter would be instantaneous and irreme-
diable except by preventing the conduct, perhaps under a clear and
present danger test. But a demonstration, while perhaps not precisely
what the Framers of the First Amendment had in mind, may be a dis-
semination of ideas by persons who do not have the money to publish
newspapers or to buy media time.'55 Moreover, First Amendment free-
doms cannot be made to depend upon the state's judgment that the
communication has not been made at an appropriate place of "public
gathering." Parks are often the ideal place for the communication of
ideas.
But in spite of having decried the distinction between speech and
conduct in these opinions, Wright nevertheless relied on the distinction
in the Ellipse demonstration case: "It must be conceded that [the] pro-
posal, like virtually all proposals for exercise of First Amendment
rights, involves not speech alone, but conduct mixed with speech."' 56
The government may regulate this conduct aspect "if it can show a
valid reason for doing so. Moreover, it is permissible for such regula-
tion to curb the speech aspect of the activities if the government can
show that the countervailing interest is 'important' or 'substantial.' 157
Because the government's interest--ecological harm to the park or in-
terference with other displays-was found to be insufficient to warrant
154. 472 F.2d at 1281. His own usual Supreme Court mentor, Justice Black, had been on
opposite sides of the matter, providing the decisive vote to permit the demonstration in the
legislative case. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
155. Wright's discussion of the relation of money to speech, wealth and freedom is the
best I have ever seen. See Wright, Politics andthe Constitution: Is Money Speech, 85 YALE
L.J. 1001 (1976) (a devastating critique of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) from the
viewpoint of Alexander Meiklejohn).
156. 472 F.2d at 1288.
157. Id
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regulation, Wright did not have occasion to forge a new free speech
theory.
A judge, especially an intermediate appellate court judge, is not
required to take giant strides. That ideas can be advanced through the
reweaving of conventional material is well illustrated in Business Exec-
utives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC,"'s which holds that the FCC
cannot bar radio and television editorials altogether, but must develop
standards and regulations to protect against abuses and excesses.
Wright has no trouble recognizing that the air waves are not Hyde
Park, and that there is not a "corner" in that mode of communication
which will sustain unlimited use for everyone.
At the same time the limited nature of broadcast time still permits
a reasonably regulated "abridgable" right to speak. Judge Wright, ap-
plying Professor Emerson's theories, presses for "the First Amendment
values of individual self-fulfillment through expression and individual
participation in public debate .... ,159 In a brilliant bit of adaptation,
Wright extrapolates the notion of free speech in radio and TV broad-
casts from the concept of free speech in public forums. If speech is
permitted at all in a public forum, then that forum's administrator may
not discriminate as to which speech will be permitted. Applying this
logic to the television and radio cases, if the media are going to broad-
cast for hire words exalting toothpaste, they cannot refuse to carry
words exalting ideas.
In an intellectual construct which typifies Wright's thinking in this
area, he states: "In the end, it may unsettle some of us to see an anti-
war message or a political party message in the accustomed place of a
soap or beer commercial. But we must not equate what is habitual with
what is right--or what is constitutional."' 160
The decision just quoted, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam
Peace v. FCC, is in a vital sense the most significant of all of Wright's
opinions on free speech. Earlier cases held that broadcasters function
as "private corporations" immune from First Amendment con-
straints. 161 James Madison may not have had cause for concern that
giant conglomerates could snuff out all dissenting speech by the simple
power of ownership of the means of communication, but for fifty years
we have recognized that cost and access are serious restraints on com-
158. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 126-28 and accompanying text
supra.
159. 450 F.2d at 655.
160. Id at 665.
161. Id at 652.
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munication. Wright has advanced the proposition that where, as in ra-
dio and television, the public air waves are used by the media in a
highly regulated system, "specific governmental approval of challenged
action by a private organization indicates 'state action.' "162 Wright
raises a crucial issue here, and in so doing, lays the foundation for a
debate which must continue if communication in America is not to be
controlled by three giant networks. 163
Wright similarly concluded that the media could not cut off debate
by prohibiting cigarette advertising on the air. The Fairness Doctrine
required counter-advertising, and Wright suspected that the prohibi-
tion was invited by cigarette companies which were losing the war of
free speech and found it more profitable to cut off their own promotion
than to bear the blows of their attackers.164 The underlying concept is
the same: the government may not suppress speech on the air waves,
nor may it tolerate suppression by others.
Wright used conventional concepts, occasionally adding his own
intellectual fillip, to protect free speech. Harking back to Cardozo's
philosophy, Wright approaches his cases with the abiding belief that
only the truth can make us free. He has never seriously grappled with
the question of whether truth really will triumph in the market place,
and if he has ever stated his philosophic concept of truth, I do not know
it. But he does, fundamentally, accept the notion that, win or lose, the
marketplace of ideas is truth's best hope. Hence, for him all presump-
tions are in favor of free speech, thus making it very difficult for anti-
free speech proposals to survive. 165
Wright's sense of practicality is always with him; he sees a need for
decisiveness on free speech issues so that self-censorship for fear of
punishment will not chill the free expression of ideas.1 66 He recognizes
tensions in First Amendment values. The lobbyist, for example, has a
right to petition, but the public and the legislature have a concomitant
right to know who is doing the lobbying. 167. The need for disclosure
makes Wright remarkably tolerant of the use of pilfered materials de-
162. Id.
163. For a recent highly relevant work, see A. REEL, NErwoRcs-How THEY STOLE
THE SHOW (1979).
164. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C.C. 1971). See also
notes 5-11 and accompanying text supra.
165. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Wright, I., dissenting).
166. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
167. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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spite his normal preference for privacy.' s His opinions are frequently
on the frontier of free speech, especially when he reviews FCC actions,
where most important First Amendment controversies now occur.
The uncertainties and problems inherent in these novel cases cause
Judge Wright to look forward with relief to the occasional case involv-
ing the outright suppression of speech or expression. One observes the
lust of joyful battle as he throws a spear into the carcass of McCarthy-
ism, recalling that repressive era in one of the rare cases involving em-
ployment discrimination because of political views. 6 ' He also joined
in the invalidation of a loyalty oath requirement for members of the
faculty at the City College of the District of Columbia. 170 He attacked
with clarity and force the notion that public employment is a "privi-
lege"--capable of being capriciously withdrawn-and not a "right."
As he stated so succinctly, there is no difference in the standards appli-
cable to membership in suspect organizations as applied to criminal
prosecution and employment dismissals. If an employee cannot be
convicted criminally for his associations, neither can he be dismissed
for his associations. 1 ' Wright carefully weaves this rule into the case
without sacrificing its exceptional power and impact.
Wright's mind is the mind of tomorrow-a mind that does not
have all the answers but that deals forthrightly with the toughest of
problems. Caught in the battle between "absolutism" and "balancing,"
Wright is troubled and does not find easy solutions. He noted in the
Edwards case'72 that Justice Black, the great absolutist, also resorted
"to a balancing approach where he perceiv[ed] 'speech plus.' ""3 But
Wright is prepared to be an absolutist where, to use his phrase, there is
"speech pure."' 74 Here there can be no abridgment at all.
The Wright canon on the First Amendment is not finished. Intel-
lectual tangles remain to be clarified, whether in opinions or in lectures.
In many respects Wright is the best the contemporary judiciary has to
offer. He gives the deepest thought to regulatory problems threatening
free expression and the public interest, and he shows the deepest con-
cern for the cry of the lone man in the corporate world.
There is a happy concatenation of geographic and intellectual
168. See not only the Pentagon Papers case but also Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
169. Rodriguez v. Seamans, 463 F.2d 837, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
170. Haskett v. Washington, 294 F. Supp. 912 (D.D.C. 1968).
171. Id at 917.
172. 397 F.2d 687, 695 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
173. 397 F.2d at 695 n.28 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578 (1965)).
174. 397 F.2d at 695 n.28.
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grace in the choice of this most western law school for a perspective on
Judge Wright. Among the jurists of the late 20th century, he has been
the foremost explorer of what is new in every reach of the Constitution,
including the First Amendment. In a land of intellectual, spiritual, and
at times physical turmoil, his has been the deepest penetration of terra
incognita.
One follows this lonely scholar in his journeys with the respect and
awe Keats felt in considering Chapman's Homer:
Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;
Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes
He star'd at the Pacific-and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise-
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.
175
A poet may confuse his explorers and still capture that watcher's
sense of "wild surmise." In considering his work as a federal court
judge and legal scholar, we can only conclude that Chief Judge J.
Skelly Wright has seen farther, and covered more new territory, than
any other legal professional of our time.
175. J. KEATS, COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF KEATs, 9 (1899).

